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Global leaders are taking unprecendented steps with long-term financial and societal impact to
prevent the spread of COVID-19, relying on early data and epidemiological models of differing
complexity. The standard “compartment” models of the spread of disease through a population
follow the law of mass action; that is, the rate of conversion of individuals from one compartment to
another is directly proportional to the number of individuals in the former. The basic S-I-R model,
which tracks susceptible, infectious, and recovered people, is functionally identical to autocatalytic
reactions studied in chemical kinetics. However, if we account for heterogeneity in individuals’
susceptibility to catch the disease, then the most susceptible individuals are likely to be removed
from the pool early; this is analogous to evaporative cooling in chemical kinetics. Here, we use
standard tools from statistical physics to account for this effect, which suggest that the rate of
appearance of new cases should be proportional to the square of the number of susceptible people in
the population, not the first power. We validate this finding with both Monte Carlo (stochastic) and
many-compartment differential equation (deterministic) simulations. This leads to quite different
predictions of the peak infection rate and final outbreak size, with the second-order model giving
milder predictions of each. This has dramatic effects on the extrapolation of a disease’s progression
when the data collected comes from the early, exponential-like region, and may remove a systematic
bias from such models.
The classic models of epidemiology divide the popula-
tion into categories based on their experience with the
disease.1,2 The simplest is the so-called S–I–R model,
which tracks the number of people susceptible to the dis-
ease, the number of people who are actively infectious,
and the number of people who are recovered (or deceased)
and are considered neither infectious nor susceptible to
re-infection. Individuals are assumed to move between
compartments by the following conversions:
I + S
β−−→ I + I, I γ−−→ R
That is, an infectious person can convert a susceptible
person into a second infectious person with a certain rate
proportional to β, and an infectious person can recover at
second rate proportional to γ. This is directly analogous
to an autocatalytic reaction in chemical kinetics.3,4
The differential equations that track the disease in the
classic S–I–R model are written as
dxS
dt
= −βxIxS (1)
dxI
dt
= βxIxS − γxI
where xS, xI, and xR track the fraction of susceptible,
infectious, and recovered people in a population, with
xS + xI + xR = 1. The model is functionally identical
to those used in chemical kinetics under the law of mass
action,7 where the rate of a reaction is directly propor-
tional to the concentration of reactants. Although this
model is very simple, it provides epidemiologists and pol-
icymakers with valuable intuition on the progression of
an outbreak, and often forms the basis for more complex
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FIG. 1: An example of the distribution observed in disease
spread. This figure categorizes infected individuals based on
the number of new infections they were believed to have
caused, from the SARS outbreak in Singapore in 2003. (Dat
extracted from ref. [5], original data from ref. [6].) A best-fit
exponential curve is shown for comparison.
models that include such effects as geography, travel, la-
tency, susceptibility to re-infection, stochasticity, vital
dynamics, etc.8,9 Our discussion focuses on the rate of
new infections, r = βxIxS, with the assumption that
many of the suggestions in this article are transferable
to more sophisticated models which include similar rate
terms.
It is well-established that there is a large heterogeneity
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2in the transmission of disease, with relatively few individ-
uals responsible for spreading the vast majority of new
cases.5,10 This is the so-called “super-spreader” effect,
in which new infections are found to roughly follow the
80/20 rule: about 80% of new cases can be attributed to
just 20% of spreaders,11–13 although for various diseases
the most infectious 20% are estimated to create around
45–90% of new cases.5 As an example, Figure 1 shows
published data on disease spread for the 2003 SARS out-
break in Singapore; most individuals infected few or no
others, but a long tail of highly infectious people exists,
which dominated the total new cases. The likelihood of
infecting new people is considered to be continuously dis-
tributed in a population.5
Although the reasons for variations in spreading are
debated, it is clear that there must a mixture of behav-
ioral attributes (such as the number of new people en-
countered by an individual in a typical day, density of
their work environment, or personal hygiene habits) and
inherent (such as genetic differences in immune system,
age, etc.). Here, we hypothesize that if the likelihood
to spread a disease follows a distribution in the popu-
lation, then the likelihood to catch a disease should—
as a first assumption—follow a similar distribution. We
can imagine that many of the same traits responsible for
spreading (e.g., frequency of encountering new people,
hygiene) apply to catching as well, while other inherent
traits (e.g., immune system,14 age, etc.) may drive vari-
ability in spreading and catching differently.
If certain people are more prone to catch a disease–
e.g., due to physiological, demographic, or geographic
conditions—then those people will be disproportionately
infected towards the beginning of an outbreak. As these
infected individuals are removed from the pool of the
susceptible, not just the number of people in the suscep-
tible pool will decrease, but also the average susceptibility
of the pool will decrease, which should slow the rate of
spread of the disease. This is analogous to evaporative
cooling effects in physical chemistry: the particles that
are removed via evaporation are disproportionately the
highest energy particles in the system, and thus the mean
energy (that is, the temperature) of the system decreases;
this slows the rate of evaporation over time.
Here we investigate the importance of this effect on epi-
demiological models, using the tools of statistical physics.
We will define an individual’s infection susceptibility, ε,
as being proportional to their likelihood of becoming in-
fected at a given instant. Under this definition, an indi-
vidual with ε=2 will become infected in half the time, on
average, as an individual with ε=1, given they exist in
the same population of infected people. Without loss of
generality, we define the mean susceptibility of the ini-
tial, uninfected population to be 1. As a first approxima-
tion, we will assume that the shape of the susceptibility
curve is qualitatively similar to the shape of the spread-
ing curve; i.e., most people are modestly susceptible, but
some people are highly susceptible. For simplicity, we
choose an exponential distribution. We will examine the
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FIG. 2: The top figure shows a distribution of infection
susceptibility in a population; the probability of the next
person infected is shown in the lower distribution. For an
exponential distribution, the mean of the lower curve is
double the mean of the upper curve.
impact of this specific choice later in this work. The
population distribution of people according to their sus-
ceptibilities can then be written as
nS(ε) ∝ e−ε/ε¯
where nS(ε) is the number density of individuals as a
function of their susceptibility ε, and ε¯ is the mean sus-
ceptibility of the population.
Since a person’s instantaneous likelihood of being in-
fected is proportional to ε, then the infection probability
population density will be
premoved(ε) ∝ ε · nS(ε) = ε e−ε/ε¯ (2)
This distribution, which we refer to as the “draw proba-
bility” is shown along with the population distribution in
Figure 2. The draw probability is skewed to the right and
will be for any assumed distribution; i.e., it is more likely
to withdraw individuals with higher susceptibilities—by
definition. For an exponential distribution, the draw
probability has a mean value of 2 ε¯ (see SI); that is, the
average person who gets sick was twice as susceptible as
the susceptible population as a whole. This will effec-
tively put downward pressure on the average susceptibil-
ity of the vulnerable pool.
How does this affect the model predictions? For
brevity, we’ll summarize the logic of the derivation here;
full rigor is provided in the SI. With our definition of sus-
ceptibility, the rate of new infections will be the integral
over all values of susceptibility:
3r =
∫ ∞
0
β xI ε
nS(ε)
Ntotal
dε
(This form is general, if the entire population has an
identical susceptibility; that is, ε=1, the above equation
simplifies to the classic S–I–R rate.) This rate equation
can be expressed in terms of the average susceptibility
(ε¯) by recognizing that
∫∞
0
ε nS(ε) dε = ε¯ NS, which gives
r = βxIε¯xS. We then need to express how the average
susceptibility ε¯ varies over the course of time; since, on
average, the susceptibility of a newly infected person is
2ε¯, the total susceptibility of the population changes as
d(ε¯NS)/dNS = 2ε¯, where NS is the number of susceptible
individuals. Accordingly, the average susceptibility of
the susceptible pool decreases in direct proportion to the
number of individuals left in the pool:
ε¯ = xS (3)
This is quite a dramatic effect, as we see when this is
inserted into the rate equation:
r = βxIx
2
S
That is, when we account for the heterogeneity of the
susceptible pool, the rate equation becomes second-order
in the number of susceptible individuals remaining!
The differential equations in the S–I–R model should
therefore be expressed as below to account for the het-
erogeneity of infection susceptibilities among the popu-
lation:
dxS
dt
= −βxIx2S (4)
dxI
dt
= βxIx
2
S − γxI
Before examining how this difference is manifested, we
need to understand the relationship between the infection
rate coefficient β in differential equations (1) and (4). At
early stages in the outbreak of a new disease, the doubling
time is often used to estimate the rate coefficients; at this
stage, xS≈1, so both the first- and second-order equations
behave identically:
dNI
dt
= βNI
7
1
xS − γNI (first-order)
dNI
dt
= βNI
7
1
x2S − γNI (second-order)
That is, an (approximately) exponential growth equation
results with xI/xI,0 = exp((β−γ)t), and (β−γ) would be
fit to doubling times in an identical fashion. (This is anal-
ogous to initial-rate measurements in chemistry.) Thus,
the estimate of β would be identical for either model, so
we can make an apples-to-apples comparison of how first-
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FIG. 3: The early stages of growth in both the first- and
second-order models follow essential exponential
characteristics, and would give identical predictions of the
rate coefficients (or R0). However, they diverge dramatically
after the early exponential phase.
and second-order behavior manifests itself as the disease
progresses, based on estimates of the rate coefficients at
early stages. This is shown in Figure 3, which tracks the
growth in either model; at early stages both models are
indistinguishable from exponential growth; however, as
the models diverge from the exponential model they also
diverge significantly from each other, with the 2nd-order
model showing much dampened growth.
We next analyze the implications of this for model pre-
dictions, in which we assume that β and γ are estimated
in the early stages of the disease, when the estimates will
be identical for either model. Figure 4 shows the results
of numerically integrating the classic first-order model,
eqs. (1), versus the second-order model that accounts for
variation in infection susceptibility, eqs. (4). The second-
order behavior becomes very significant as the epidemic
progresses, ultimately predicting a less steep peak and
a substantially lower percentage of individuals who are
eventually infected.
A crucial output of an S–I–R-like model is the fraction
of the population that must gain immunity before the
rate of new cases falls into decline (often referred to as
herd or community immunity). When xS falls bellow a
critical value, x∗S, then the sign of dxI/dt changes from
positive to negative; i.e., the disease is no longer formally
an epidemic. Policymakers (ideally) take into consider-
ation predictions of x∗S to determine when the outbreak
will begin to decline naturally, and thus when it is safe to
loosen societal constraints, such as stay-at-home orders.
The first-order and second-order models have different
predictions for x∗S:
x∗S =
γ
β
=
1
R0
(first-order)
x∗S =
√
γ
β
=
1√
R0
(second-order)
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FIG. 4: Comparison of the traditional, first-order S–I–R model (left) with a second-order model that accounts for variability
in susceptibility. The critical fraction of susceptible individuals, x∗S, is indicated on the plot. Based on identical assumptions
about doubling and decay times that would be observed at early stages of an epidemic, the models predict very different final
infection rates.
(β/γ is often referred to as R0, the basic reproduction
number, in epidemiological reports.2) These critical x∗S’s
are shown with dashed lines on the figure for both mod-
els. For the second-order model, the peak occurs when a
much lower fraction of the population is infected. With
the arbitrary parameters chosen for the current model—
which we emphasize are not chosen to accurately sim-
ulate any current outbreak—we see the implications are
quite dramatic: the classic S–I–R model suggests the out-
break goes into decline when ∼50% of the population has
gained immunity, whereas if we account for heterogeneity
in infection susceptibility, we see this number is closer to
25%. These estimates would lead to very different policy
implications and economic outfall.
The second-order behavior was inferred by assum-
ing that infection susceptibilities are continuously dis-
tributed in a population. If this is correct, we should see
the same behavior emerge if we compartmentalize the
population into discrete levels of susceptibility, then al-
low the number of these compartments to grow. We per-
formed such simulations using both stochastic and deter-
ministic approaches, both of which are described in the
SI. For the stochastic (Monte Carlo) simulations, we di-
vided the population into discrete levels of susceptibility,
and randomly withdrew individuals according to the dis-
tribution of equation (2). During this process, we saw
the ε¯ of the susceptible pool decrease in direct propor-
tion to xS, as predicted by equation (3), and the overall
population susceptibility followed x2S. Our determinis-
tic simulations took the same approach of compartmen-
talizing the population, but treated each compartment
with a separate differential equation. We show results
of of numerically integrating the differential equations
in Figure 5, with a single compartment (that is, every-
one has ε=1), the first-order behavior is recovered; as
we add compartments we quickly see the second-order
behavior emerge. This suggests that models that explic-
itly include categories for variation in susceptibility or
transmission15–17 may implicitly capture at least a por-
tion of the second-order behavior, though more detailed
comparisons are required.
In our treatment so far, we have used an exponen-
tial distribution to capture the variability in suscepti-
bility in a population. This “Boltzmann” distribution
allows us to use the tools of statistical physics to ex-
amine the consequences of this effect, leading to a very
simple, yet consequential result: changing a first-order
term to a second-order term. What happens if the dis-
tribution of susceptibilities in the population follows a
different distribution? For a hint at possible distribution
shapes we can examine those for disease spreaders. As
mentioned earlier, in an examination of several diseases,
the most infectious 20% of spreaders were found to be
responsible for 45–90% of new infections;5 under the ex-
ponential distribution, the top 20% of spreaders would
be responsible for about 50% of new cases. Therefore,
we can consider the exponential distribution to be on the
conservative end of estimates. If the true initial distribu-
tion of susceptibility has a longer tail (that is, a greater
proportion of highly-susceptible individuals) than the ex-
ponential distribution, this will make the effect more pro-
nounced. That is, these very high-ε individuals will be
disproportionately “discovered” at the beginning of the
outbreak, putting even greater downward pressure on the
average, before the dynamics of the process ultimately
convert the distribution to a more exponential-like form.
The effect of the initial distribution can readily be sim-
ulated with either the stochastic or binned deterministic
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FIG. 5: When the population is binned according to assumed infection susceptibility, 2nd order behavior emerges naturally.
The left plot shows the results of integrating a pure 1st-order and pure 2nd-order model as limiting cases, and compares
integrating a first-order model with the population binned by susceptibility with an increasing number of bins. The binning
structure is shown on the right; the height of the block indicates the population density of the bin, and the red dot indicates
the mean of the bin used in the discrete model.
approaches discussed earlier. If the variability in suscep-
tibility among individuals in the population is low: say
that the entire population fell in 0.9 < ε < 1.1, then this
effect will be much less pronounced. However, we em-
phasize that any variability in susceptibility between in-
dividuals in the population will always lead to the average
susceptibility of those infected, 〈ε〉removed, to be greater
than the average susceptibility of the uninfected pool,
which will still put downward pressure on the mean. It
is only in the (unrealistic) limit that all individuals have
identical susceptibility (ε=1) that the first-order model
emerges.
Interestingly, in both types of simulations we ran, we
found that the dynamics of the process itself pushed dis-
tributions into an exponential shape. As we describe
in the SI, even if we set the initial population to have
such extreme shapes as a uniform distribution or a lin-
ear decay, the shape of the distribution evolved into an
exponential distribution. This is perhaps not surprising,
as the exponential (Boltzmann) distribution is derived
as the distribution that maximizes entropy18,19—that is,
the most probable distribution—and we can expect pro-
cesses to evolve towards such high-entropy states. (We
derive the mechanism for this effect in the SI.) Given
these factors, we suspect that the exponential distribu-
tion is not just a reasonable and convenient distribution,
but the most appropriate one to use in the absence of
more detailed information.
There are other factors which could make this effect ei-
ther more or less pronounced. First, this derivation does
not assume any correlation between spreading propen-
sity and infection susceptibility. Put simply: are some
super-spreaders also super-catchers? If a positive corre-
lation exists between super-spreaders and super-catchers,
then the super-spreaders will be most active at the be-
ginning of an outbreak and contribute disproportionately
to the rate of infection, but as the outbreak progresses,
they also will be disproportionately removed, causing a
more downward pressure on the relative rate of infec-
tion. In contrast, if there is no correlation, then super-
spreaders pop up throughout the outbreak with a fre-
quency identical to their prevalence in the population,
and the average kinetics are unaffected. It seems plausi-
ble that many of the social traits that are found in super-
spreaders also would be common in super-catchers. We
leave the mathematical analysis of this possible syner-
gistic effect to future work, but if a positive correlation
exists, we might consider the second-order behavior to
be a lower bound on the kinetic effects of variation in
population in the S–I–R model. On the other hand, an
implicit assumption in our derivation is that individuals’
susceptibilities are static quantities; that is, they do not
significantly change with time. For example, if an indi-
vidual changes their behavior patterns from one month
to the next, they may go from having a low susceptibil-
ity to a high susceptibility. We leave the balance between
these two counter-balancing factors to future works, but
for now we consider the second-order model to be a rea-
sonable approximation, and a significant deviation from
the classic first-order model.
The prior analysis raises the question: Can this mod-
ification to the S–I–R model account for any discrepan-
cies in real-world data? We believe this modification
may remove an implicit, systematic bias which would
push the model predictions of the ultimate size of out-
breaks downward. It is not uncommon for models to
over-predict the ultimate size of epidemics.20,22,23 (Al-
though there certainly can be other reasons that mod-
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FIG. 6: Final size of the 2009 H1N1 influenza outbreak,
estimated from 11 serological studies,20 compared to
predictions of the outbreak size based on 78 published
estimates of the reproductive number,21 in both the 1st- and
2nd-order models.
els predict worse-than-observed outcomes, including suc-
cessful public-health interventions.) The classic S–I–R
model predicts the final size of an epidemic based on the
basic reproduction number (β/γ) to be given by the im-
plicit equation below, although we note that temporary
measures such as social distancing can reduce the final
size of an outbreak.2,24 The equations for the final size,
expressed as the final proportion of susceptible (never-
infected) individuals x∞S in the 1st- and 2nd-order models
are:
x∞S = exp
{
−γ
β
(1− x∞S + xI,0)
}
(1st-order)
x∞S =
β
γ
(2nd-order)
In the 2009 H1N1 influenza outbreak, estimates of the
final outbreak size—which were based on the initial re-
productive numbers—were reportedly much higher than
occurred in practice;20 we expect this pandemic to be a
reasonable test of the model predictions, since the out-
break reached global proportions while large-scale inter-
ventions, such as social distancing, were not employed.
The ultimate fraction of the population infected was on
the order of 20%, as measured by seroepidemiological
studies and shown in Figure 6. The classic, 1st-order S–I–
R model gave predictions of the final proportion infected
to be greater than 50% (on average), as also shown in the
figure. (We calculated these values based on 78 measure-
ments of the reproductive number from reference [21];
our final-size calculations are in agreement with refer-
ence [20].) Using the same 78 published estimates of
reproductive numbers, the final size estimated from the
second-order model is around 30% and much closer to
the final size observed in practice, as shown in the figure.
In conclusion, if we account for heterogenerity in in-
fection susceptibility, the rate equation of the standard
S–I–R model is changed from first- to second-order. This
provides a mathematically simple route to account for
variability in human populations that are implicitly ne-
glected in classic epidemiological models, although its in-
teractions with more complex simulations need to be de-
termined. Similar arguments should hold for models in
population biology where populations exhibit variability,
such as in the classic predator–prey models.25 We hope
that this insight, from analagous systems in chemical ki-
netics and statistical physics, can help to inform future
epidemiological models, and perhaps remove an inherent
systematic bias from model predictions.
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S1. Detailed derivation of emergence of second-order kinetics
Here, we provide a more detailed derivation of the emergence of second-order kinetics. We follow the classic
S–I–R model, where the population is divided into susceptible, infectious, and recovered, and define NS, NI,
and NR as the number of people in each of these compartments. The fraction of the population in these
compartments is xS, xI, and xR, defined by dividing each of these numbers by the total population, Ntotal
(= NS + NI + NR). We also assume a “virgin epidemic” [1], in which the entire population is in principle
susceptible to the disease (minus the tiny fraction infected at the start of the model). We examine the virgin
S–I–R model for simplicity and transparency, and this general framework should lend itself to adaptation to
more complex models.
We define an individual’s infection susceptibility ε to be proportional to their instantaneous rate of
becoming infected. If we have discrete levels of susceptibility in a population, the rate equation of new
infections is written as
r(εi) = β xI εi xS,i (discrete εi)
where xS,i is the fraction of the total population with susceptibility εi. If we assume the susceptibility is
continuously distributed with a distribution given by nS(ε), then the rate will formally be defined as
rˆ(ε) = β xI ε
nS(ε)
Ntotal
(continuous ε) (S.1)
rˆ(ε) is properly a distribution of rates; a finite rate for a specific range of susceptibilities is obtained by
integrating rˆ(ε) between any two values of ε. The total rate of new infections at any point in time is then
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r =
∑
i
β xI εi xS,i (discrete εi)
r =
∫ ∞
0
β xI ε
nS(ε)
Ntotal
dε (continuous ε)
We can note that the average susceptibility of the susceptible pool can be calculated, at any time, by
ε¯ =
∑
i
εixS,i (discrete εi)
ε¯ =
∫∞
0
ε nS(ε) dε
NS
(continuous ε)
Thus, in either case the rate of new infections simplifies to
r = β xI ε¯ xS (discrete or continuous) (S.2)
where we emphasize that the mean susceptibility ε¯ of this population can change over the course of the
epidemic, consistent with the definitions of ε¯ above.
Equation (S.2) is general and applies to any distribution—discrete, continuous, or single-valued. We also
enforce that the average susceptibility is one at time zero, ε¯0=1, to ensure compatibility of the definition of ε¯
with the classic model. (We note that we recover the classic S–I–R model by assuming that every individual
is identically susceptible to infection; that is, when ε¯(t) = ε¯0 = 1.) We next need to find how this value
changes in response to the epidemic.
For reasons we discuss in the text and in Section S4, we choose a continuous, exponential distribution to
describe the variation in infection susceptibility within the population. This distribution is given by
nS(ε) =
NS
ε¯
· e−ε/ε¯
We can verify that the total number of individuals in the distribution is NS and that the mean of this
distribution is given by ε¯: ∫ ∞
0
nS(ε) dε =
NS
ε¯
∫ ∞
0
e−ε/ε¯ dε = NS
〈ε〉 =
∫∞
0
ε · e−ε/ε¯dε∫∞
0
e−ε/ε¯dε
=
[− (εε¯+ ε¯2) e−ε/ε¯]∞
0[−ε¯e−ε/ε¯]∞
0
= ε¯
For convenience, we will define the total susceptibility of the population as E ≡ NS · ε¯ =
∫∞
0
ε nS(ε) dε. The
average ε of a person removed from the population, at any instant in time, is found from the distribution of
rates as (see note in Section S1.1 below)
〈ε〉removed ≡
∫∞
0
ε · rˆ(ε) dε∫∞
0
rˆ(ε) dε
=
[−ε¯ · (ε2 + 2ε¯ ε+ 2(ε¯)2) e−ε/ε¯]∞
0[−ε¯ · (ε+ ε¯) e−ε/ε¯]∞
0
= 2ε¯ (S.3)
That is, the average not-yet-infected person has susceptibility of ε¯, while the average person becoming
infected has susceptibility 2ε¯. This is valid at any time, provided the population stays exponentially dis-
tributed (which, as we discuss in Section S4 we consider to be a reasonable assertion). Therefore, the total
susceptibility of the pool changes as
dE
dNS
= 2ε¯
Since E = ε¯ NS, it follows that
dE
dNS
= ε¯+NS
dε¯
dNS
. Combined with the previous result, we obtain:
2
dε¯
dNS
=
ε¯
NS
which upon integration gives
ε¯
ε¯0
=
NS
NS,0
For the case of a virgin epidemic ε¯0 = 1 and NS,0 ≈ Ntotal, so we find
ε¯ = xS (S.4)
That is, the average susceptibility decreases in direct proportion to the fraction of the population still
susceptible. Inserting this into our rate equation, (S.2), gives rise to second-order kinetics:
r = βxIx
2
S
And thus, if we account for the heterogeneity of infection susceptibility in the population, the S–I–R model
should be written as
d
dt
 xSxI
xR
 =
 −βxIx2SβxIx2S − γxI
γxI

S1.1. Note: instantaneous average susceptibility of those withdrawn
Here, we provide justification for equation (S.3). (Note that for simplicity, we referred to this as the “draw
probability” in the main text; what we provide here is more rigorous.) Let’s first consider the simple case
where we just have two discrete susceptibilities, ε1 and ε2. The average ε of those individuals withdrawn
(infected) in the time period between t and t+ δt is
〈ε〉removed =
ε1 ·
(
number withdrawn
with ε1 in (t, t+ δt)
)
+ ε2 ·
(
number withdrawn
with ε2 in (t, t+ δt)
)
(
number withdrawn
with ε1 in (t, t+ δt)
)
+
(
number withdrawn
with ε2 in (t, t+ δt)
)
〈ε〉removed =
ε1 ·
∫ t+δt
t
r1 dt+ ε2 ·
∫ t+δt
t
r2 dt∫ t+δt
t
r1 dt+
∫ t+δt
t
r2 dt
Taking the limit as δt→ 0 gives us the instantaneous average ε of those withdrawn at time t (using L’Hoˆpital’s
Rule and the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus):
〈ε〉removed = ε1r1 + ε2r2
r1 + r2
This can be generalized to any number of levels as
〈ε〉removed =
∑
i εiri∑
i ri
In the continuum limit, the above becomes
〈ε〉removed =
∫∞
0
ε · rˆ(ε) dε∫∞
0
rˆ(ε) dε
3
S1.2. Alternative derivation
We provide here a brief, qualitative derivation that reaches the same conclusion as above, in an alternate
framework that may be more intuitive to some. First, consider the exponential distribution; the “sliver” at
ε=0 represents an infinitesimally small segment of the population that can never become sick. This “sliver”
will never leave the susceptible category, and thus the height of the curve at ε=0 will stay constant with
time. The population distribution was given as
nS(ε) =
NS
ε¯
· e−ε/ε¯
where the intercept is NS/ε¯. At time zero, in a virgin epidemic, this quantity is
NS
ε¯
=
Ntotal
ε¯0
Since the intercept does not change with time, the above equality must be true at all times. Putting in ε¯0=1
and xS = NS/Ntotal, we immediately find
ε¯ = xS
S2. Monte Carlo (stochastic) simulations
To numerically validate the response of the mean population susceptibility ε¯ to the dynamics, as well as to
explore the effect of the initial distribution, we performed Monte Carlo (stochastic) simulations. In these
simulations, we divided the population into small compartments, each with the same value of ε; that is, all
individuals in bin i had a discrete susceptibility εi. As we increase the number of compartments, the spacing
between adjacent values of εi becomes smaller, approaching the continuous limit.
The probability of drawing from bin i is proportional to the number of individuals in that bin times the
susceptibility of that bin, that is
pi ∝ xS,i εi
In the main text, we referred to this as the “draw probability”. After assigning an initial distribution of
the population—that is, filling the bins, which as a first approximation we assigned as exponential—we next
sampled from the above probability distribution. That is, we drew a random number and assigned it to one
of the above categories based on its probability.
Figure S-1 shows a snapshot of this Monte Carlo simulation for N=100,000 individuals divided into
M=1000 bins. Initially, the bins were distributed according to an exponential distribution with mean
susceptibility ε¯=1. The bins were spaced such that each bin initially had 100 individuals in it; that is, bins
on the right were wide and bins on the left were narrow. Samples were withdrawn from bins one-by-one
according to the probability distribution above. This figure was made when 40,000 individuals had been
removed from the pool of susceptible. The top–left plot shows a histogram of the current distribution of
individuals according to their susceptibility, which we can see has remained exponential. The curve below
this shows the draw probability, which is simply the population of each bin times the susceptibility ε of
that bin. The top–right curve shows the average susceptibility ε¯ of the susceptible pool; importantly, we see
this decreasing in direct proportion to xS, as predicted by equation (S.4). The curve below this shows the
total susceptibility of the population over the course of the simulation, where we see second-order behavior
emerge. Our Monte Carlo simulations were in excellent agreement with the equations derived in this work,
which are shown in the figure with the curve marked “theory”.
The simulation described here started with a perfect exponential distribution. In Section S4, we discuss
the effect if another distribution was instead assumed.
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Figure S-1: Snapshot of Monte Carlo simulation of sampling according to εi · xS,i.
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S3. Binned first-order numerical integration (deterministic) sim-
ulations
In principle, if we divide the population into many bins according to their susceptibilities εi, and run a
first-order model assuming classic S–I–R behavior, we should see the second-order behavior emerge as the
number of bins is increased. In this approach, we can divide individuals into M + 2 compartments: infected
(I), recovered (R), and susceptible (Si, for i = 1, · · · ,M). The ordinary differential equations (ODEs) for
this first-order model are then written as
dxS,i
dt
= −ri for i = 1, · · · ,M
dxI
dt
=
M∑
i
ri − γ xI
dxR
dt
= γ xI
with
ri = βxIεixS,i
We numerically integrated the above set of M + 2 equations, using the LSODA package as implemented
in SciPy [2]. This allowed us to explore the effect of increasing the number of bins M . In all simulations, we
kept the mean of the initial population ε¯0 to be 1. When only a single bin was used (M=1), all individuals
have identical susceptibility ε=1; this limit therefore is identical to the classic S–I–R model. As the number
of bins M becomes large, we approach the continuum limit: that is, ε is continuously distributed in the
population. We can thus test to see if second-order behavior emerges by increasing the number of bins in a
first-order model.
The results of this were shown in the main text of the manuscript, where we did indeed see second-order
behavior emerging. This was shown assuming the initial distribution was exponentially distributed (when
M > 1), and we again saw the distribution remain exponential throughout the course of the simulation. We
discuss the effect of other initial distributions in Section S4.
S4. Emergence of exponential distribution
In statistical physics, the “Boltzmann” distribution, e−ε/kBT , arises naturally by maximizing entropy under
the constraint of conserving energy; this is actually how the concept of temperature is formally derived in
many textbooks. [3] (In this equation, kB is the Boltzmann constant, which serves to convert units between
temperature T and energy ε.) In the Boltzmann distribution, the energies ε are the microscopic distribution:
such as kinetic energies of gas-molecules. As a maximum-entropy distribution, this implies that this is the
most likely distribution to be encountered at a given temperature.
In the mathematics and simulations described in the text, we chose the exponential distribution to
describe the variability in susceptibilities ε that might be encountered in a population, both due to its
similarity to published curves for spreading and its elegance in mathematical treatments. What happens if
the initial distribution of ε in the susceptible population follows a different distribution? We can test this
quite simply by running either our Monte Carlo or binned-ODE simulation with different initial distributions.
Interestingly, when we do so, we find that all distributions of ε tend towards the exponential distribution
during the course of the simulation, which we observed in both the Monte Carlo and the binned-ODE
simulations. We tested this even on extreme distribution shapes, such as uniform and triangle-shaped
distributions, and we invariantly saw distributions tend towards a Boltzmann shape (which we quantified
6
based on the distribution’s root-mean-squared error, RMSE, versus an exponential distribution with the
same mean).
We show this for a triangle distribution in Figure S-2. The left column shows the progression in the
binned ODE model; the initial population was given a “triangle” distribution: that is, a linear decay from
the y intercept to 0. As the simulation progresses, the shape of the distribution progresses towards an
exponential distribution. We see exactly the same behavior (but with noise) in the case of the Monte Carlo
simulation. We emphasize that no mathematics including an exponential distribution of ε’s was introduced
into either simulation; the distribution emerges naturally from the dynamics.
Why does this occur? Clearly the mechanism is different than in the cases Boltzmann was considering,
where particles exchange energy with one another. Here, we have explicitly assumed that individuals’
susceptibilities are static—that is, they do not naturally re-distribute over the time scale of an epidemic.
We can consider the distribution of susceptibilities, which we’ll write here as nS(ε,N), to evolve with the
number of people removed from the susceptible pool, N , according to the differential equation:
dnS(ε,N)
dN
= −a ε nS(ε,N)
Upon integration, this results in
nS(ε,N) = nS(ε, 0) e
−a εN
If the initial distribution is exponential (nS(ε, 0) = e
−b ε, with b > 0), we see that the distribution stays
exponential at all times:
nS(ε,N) = e
−b εe−a εN = e−(b+aN)·ε
Now let’s examine if the initial distribution is a perturbation from an exponential (nS(ε, 0) = e
−(b+N (ε))ε),
where N (ε) describes the perturbation from an exponential distribution, which we’ll assume to be within a
similar magnitude as b for all ε. We have
nS(ε,N) = e
−(b+N (ε))·εe−a εN = exp {− (b+ aN +N (ε)) · ε}
We can see from the above equation that as N grows, b+aN will start to dominate over N (ε), thus making
the distribution tend towards an exponential. In our simulations, we saw this for such large perturbations
as triangle- and square-shaped initial distributions.
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Figure S-2: Emergence of an exponential distribution from a triangle distribution in binned ODE (left
column) and Monte Carlo (right column) simulations.
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